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JURISDICTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT - TWO CASES TO NOTE
TIM GAMMON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1960 there were no uniform rules of practice for the
United States Courts of Appeals. Chief Justice Earl Warren's
appointment in 1960 of a Standing Committee on Practice and
Procedure and an Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules was the
beginning of a process that led first to the March 1964 Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Uniform Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure
and ultimately to the current Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
which were adopted by Congress December 4, 1967, and made
effective July 1, 1968.1
Uniform rules, however, have not produced complete
uniformity of practice and consistency of decision either among the
thirteen United States Courts of Appeals or even within the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The two unrelated
*A.B. Drury College, Springfield, Missouri, 1968; M.Ed. Drury College, 1970; ,J.D St. Louis
University, 1974; LL.M. Harvard University, 1976; currently staffattorney, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
1. 9j. MOORE, W. TAGGART &J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAl. PRACTICE, § 2.1-.3 (2d ed. 1983)
(hereinafter cited as MOORE's). Chief Justice Warren appointed Judge E. Barrett Prettyman as the
first chairman of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules. Currently the chairman of the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure for the United States Judicial Conference is Judge
Edward T. Gignoux, director of the Administrative Office for the United States Courts. REPORTS OF
iHE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 65 (1984).
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Eighth Circuit cases discussed in this Article suggest that
inconsistency, lack of uniformity, and uncertainty persist. But the
focus of the Article is not to criticize those decisions; rather it is to
call attention to the rulings because they have important
jurisdictional implications for federal practitioners in the Eighth
Circuit.
II. CAMPBELL V. WHITE
The first case, Campbell v. White,2 was significant because it
reversed a standing practice of the Eighth Circuit to construe late
notices of appeal as motions for extensions, particulary in pro se
cases, where the result of that construction was to save appeals from
automatic dismissal as untimely.
Darron Campbell appealed the dismissal of his civil rights
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the thirty-second
day after entry of judgment. 3 The notice was not within the thirty
day period prescribed by the federal rules but was within the period
in which the appellant could seek an extension. The Eighth Circuit
had to decide whether to dismiss the appeal as untimely, or
construe the notice of appeal as a motion for extension. If construed
as a motion for extension, the Eighth Circuit could remand to the
district court because the district court has jurisdiction over
motions for extension. 4 The precedent for remanding on the
extension issue was established in a 1976 decision in which the
Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to consider a
nunc pro tunc motion for extension which, if granted, would have
rendered timely the notice of appeal, which was filed on the thirty-
eighth day after judgment. 5  The Eighth Circuit, in several
2. 721 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1983).
3. Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d 644, 645 (8th Cir. 1983).
4. Id. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Rule 4(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: "In a civil case
1t ntice 0f appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days
aftier the date ofentry ofthejudgment .... " FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). But Rule 4(a)(5) provides:
The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
tiite to1Y filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the
expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a). Any such motion which is filed
bef'ore expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the court otherwise
requires. Notice of any such prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in
accordance with local rules. No such extension shall exceed 30 days past such
prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.
id.
In Campbell, as in all the cases discussed in this section, no motion for extension was filed in the
district court within the time prescribed by Rule 4.
5. Seshachalam v. Creighton University School of Medicine, 545 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dented. 433 U.S. 909 (1977). In a case prior to Seshachalam, the Eighth Circuit assumed arguendo that it
had the power to remand for a determination of excusable neglect but suggested that when no motion
[VOL. 60:717
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unpublished orders, had followed this practice of remanding cases
when the notice of appeal was not timely filed but was filed within
the thirty-day extension period that may be granted by the district
court. The Eighth Circuit had followed this practice despite the
1979 amendment of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 6
Prior to the 1979 amendment of the appellate rules, appellate
courts often allowed appellants to seek an extension either before or
after the extension period had expired, so long as a notice of appeal
was filed during the extension period.' But the 1979 amendment of
Rule 4 appeared to mandate that a motion to extend the time be
filed no later than thirty days after the expiration of the original
appeal time. 8 Rule 4(a)(5) as amended in 1979 thus "rejects such
cases as Evans [and the others cited above in footnote 7] that permit
a showing of excusable neglect long after the fact when the
appellant has neglected to make his Rule 4(a)(5) motion on time." 9
This also eliminated the distinction between remand and dismissal
without prejudice to apply to the district court for a nunc pro tunc
extension after the extension period has run.
In Campbell, the Eight Circuit was faced with a dilemma. The
panel could follow the holding announced in Sechachalam, decided
before the 1979 amendment of Rule 4, or the court could reverse
the holding in Sechachalam based on the apparent clear language of
for extension or showing of excusable neglect was made within the thirty-day extension period,
normally the court of appeals should not remand. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Kurtenbach, 525 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1975).
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Wyrick, No. 82-2229 (8th Cir. unpublished order of Nov. 29, 1982) (civil);
Herzog v. Morrisons, No. 82-1466 (8th Cir. unpublished order ofJuly 14, 1982) (civil); McClain v.
Meier, No. 81-1437 (8th Cir. unpublished order ofJune 15, 1981)(civil); Smith v. Mercy Hospital,
No. 80-1703 (8th Cir. unpublished order of Oct. 1, 1980) (civil). Seealso United States v. Yancy, No.
82-1285 (8th Cir. order of Aug. 31, 1982) (criminal).
7. 9 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 1 204.13[2] at 4-100 to 4-101. Paragraph 204.13[2] provides as
follows: "If the notice of appeal was filed within the 30th day [of the extension period], but the
motion to establish excusable neglect [was] filed after the 30th day, most of the decisions held the
extension could be granted." Id. (citing Craig v. Garrison, 549 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1977);
Seshachalam v. Creighton University School of Medicine, 545 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 909 (1977); Sanchez v. Dallas Morning News, 543 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 911 (1979); Salazar v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 538 F.2d 269 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976); In re Buckingham Super Markets, Inc., 534 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir.
1976): Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 511 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir. 1975); Lashley v. Ford Motor Co., 518
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1975); Chinese Maritime Trust, Ltd. v. Carolina Shipping Co., 456 F.2d 192 (4th
Cir. 1972); Torockio v. Chamberlain Mfg. Co., 456 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1972); Pasquale v. Finch,
418 F.2d 627 (lst Cir. 1969); Reed v. State of Michigan, 398 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1968); C-Thru
Prods., Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 397 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1968); Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir.
1966)).
8. See FED. R. App. P. 4. Rule 4(b) pertaining to criminal appeals contains no requirement that
the motion for extension be made before the extension period runs, thus "the liberality generally
extended to [the] 'notice of appeal' in criminal cases has permitted the court of appeals to treat a
request for extension of time as a notice of appeal, or a late filed notice of appeal as a request for an
extension." 9 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 204.19 at 4-132 (citing United States v. Gibson, 568 F.2d Ill
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Williams, 508 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mills, 430
F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971)). Seealso United States v. Lucas, 597 F.2d
243 (10th Cir. 1979).
9.9 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 204.13[2] at 4-103.
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the amended rule and the weight of case authority since the
amendment. In four 1° of the five" United States Courts of Appeals
that had considered the issue prior to Campbell, the courts followed
the literal language of the rule and held "the result of [a] failure to
file a timely notice of appeal, followed by failure to make a timely
motion to be permitted to file one out of time extinguishes the right
to appeal beyond revival by either the district court or the court of
appeals. "12
The majority in Campbell rejected Sechachalam and held that the
notice could not be construed as a motion for an extension. 13 The
court thus dismissed the appeal for lack of a timely notice of
appeal.' 4 Judge John R. Gibson, writing for the majority,
discussed Shah v. Hutto, 15 the one circuit opinion going the other
way, and concluded the dissenting opinion in Shah16 was more
persuasive as it followed the opinion of the other circuits, the clear
language of the amendment, and the committee comments
concerning the amendment.' 7 The panel majority declined to rule
prospectively, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit had done in Sanchez v. Board of Regents of Texas Southern
University. 18 The Eighth Circuit found that, unlike Sanchez, the
instant case involved a notice filed more than three years after the
rule change and after development of a considerable body of case
law from other circuits had made clear the import of the rule. 19
Recognizing the harsh results that enforcement of the holding
10. See Briggs v. Lucas, 678F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1982); Brooks v. Britton, 669 F.2d 665 (11 th Cir.
1982); Pettibone v. Cupp, 666 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1981); Wyzik v. Employee Ben. Plan of Crane
Co., 663 F.2d 348 (1st Cir. 1981); Oda v. Transcon Lines Corp., 650 F.2d 231 (10th Cir. 1981);
Sanchez v. Board of Regents of Texas Southern University, 625 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1980) (court held
motion for extension must be within thirty days, but remanded holding the ruling was prospective
only because the effect of the ruling was to depart from the prior law of the circuit).
11. SeeShah v. Hutton, 704 F.2d 717, rev'd, 722 F.2d 1167 (en banc)(4th Cir. 1983).
12. 9 MOORE'S, supra note 1, 204.13[2] at 4-104 (footnote omitted).
13. Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d 644, 646-47 (8th Cir. 1983).
14. Id. A timely notice of appeal is mandatory, jurisdictional, and requisite for perfecting an
appeal. Browder v. Director, Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, reh. denied, 434 U.S.
1089 (1978); USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, Ltd., 578 F.2d 21, 22 (Ist Cir. 1978); Edwards v.
Joyner, 566 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir. 1978); Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 899 (3d Cir. 1976);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kurtenbach, 525 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1975).
The courts of appeals are without power toextend the period within which a notice of appeal may be
liled. See Moorer v. Griffin, 575 F.2d 87/, 9 (6th Cir. 1978); Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818, 819
(7th Cir. 1977); Morin v. United States, 522 F.2d 8, 9 (4th Cir. 1975); Stirling v. Chemical Bank,
511 F.2d 1030, 1032 (2d Cir. 1975).
15. 704 F.2d 717, rev'd, 722 F.2d 1167 (en banc)(4th Cir. 1983).
16. Shah v. Hutto, 704 F.2d 717, 721 (Hall,J., dissenting), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1167 (en banc) (4th
Cir. 1983).
17. Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d at 646. Subsequent to Campbell, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Shah. Shah v. Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167 (4th
Cir. 1983). The en banc majority followed the literal language of the 1979 amendment of Rule 4 and
held that a bare notice of appeal should not be construed as a motion for extension of time, where no
request for additional time is manifest. Id. at 1168-69.
18. 625 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1980).
19. Campbell v. White, 721 F.2d at 647.
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might have, the court directed the district court clerks to screen
notices of appeal and advise pro se litigants of the need for extension
motions where appropriate.20 The court further directed that
district court clerks should prepare a notice to be given to all
litigants informing them of the time limitations of Rule 4 and the
necessity of filing a motion for extension within the thirty-day
extension period when a timely notice of appeal was not filed. 21
Judge Myron Bright dissented in Campbell, stating he would
follow the previous rulings of the Eighth Circuit and "would
remand to permit Campbell to amend his implied motion for
extension of time by filing a written motion, to be deemed filed nunc
pro tunc as of the date of the late notice of appeal, and to permit the
district court to rule on the request. "22 Judge Bright relied on the
majority panel opinion in Shah to support that conclusion. He cited
that portion of Shah that decried such a literal reading as making the
rule into a trap for the unwary. 23
The opinion is noteworthy because it represented a reversal of
court policy, although the majority was careful to base its holding
on the new language in Rule 4 following the 1979 amendment.
While there are points in both the majority and minority decisions
that commend themselves, the decision is praiseworthy because the
court was willing to change the rule, publish the opinion, and direct
the district courts to prepare notices designed to eliminate the
situation in the future. While the holding may be characterized as a
break with certain Eighth Circuit precedents, it reestablished the
jurisdictional mandate of a timely notice of appeal and cleared up
any uncertainty created by the 1979 amendment of Rule 4.
III. In re LEIMER
The second case, In re Leimer,24 was important because it
expanded the kinds of orders that can be appealed in bankruptcy
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (Bright,J., dissenting).
23. Id. (quoting Shah v. Hutto, 704 F.2d 717, 720, rev'd, 722 F.2d 1167 (en banc) (4th Cir.
1983)). The court in Shah stated as follows:
There is no doubt, however, that the notice was a clear indication of their intention to
appeal, and implicit in that is a wish to do and have done whatever was necessary to
preserve and protect their rights. If someone in the clerk's office had informed them of
the delay and of the appropriateness of a motion for an extension of time, there is little
doubt but that they would have embraced the suggestion. Unless the notice of appeal
is given such a construction, the rule becomes a trap for the unwary.
Shah v. Hutto, 704 F.2d at 720.
24. 724 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1984).
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matters prior to a determination of all issues and parties under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. The case is also important because it reversed an
unpublished prior decision without an en banc hearing.
Aetna Life Insurance had initiated adversary proceedings
against Reuben F. Leimer, as debtor, to release certain land from
an automatic bankruptcy stay.25 The bankruptcy court refused to
release the land from the automatic stay. That prevented Aetna
from selling the land through a state proceeding it had initiated.2 6
Aetna sought leave to appeal to the district court. The district
court denied leave to appeal based on Ewald v. The Cornelius Co. 27 In
Ewald the Eighth Circuit held that the grant of relief in adversary
proceedings to lift a stay was an interlocutory order.
Aetna then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, presenting that court with a jurisdictional
dilemma. The Eighth Circuit had to decide whether it should
dismiss the appeal, following Ewald, or entertain the appeal,
overruling Ewald, based on In re Bestmann.2 8 Reasons to follow
Ewald were that it would avoid piecemeal appeals and uphold the
finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,29 and it would be
consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent holding that remands to
government agencies and lower courts are not appealable. 30 In
contrast, the Eighth Circuit in In re Bestmann31 held that it had
jurisdiction to review a district court order refusing to entertain an
appeal from a final order of the bankruptcy court. 32
25. In re Lenmer, 724 F.2d 744, 744 (8th Cir. 1984).
26. Id. The land was under the automatic stay because Leimer claimed he was the beneficiary of
a trust that included the land among its assets. Aetna argued that it owned the land by virtue of a
deed oftrust that it obtained as security for a loan it made to the Leimer trust. Id.
27. Id. Specifically, the district court held the case did not present the important questions of law
or extraordinary circumstances that would cause it to grant an interlocutory appeal. Id.
28. Id. at 745. See In re Bestmann, 720 F.2d 484, 486-87 (8th Cir. 1983) (circuit court of appeals
has Jurisdiction to review a district court's final order).
29. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1977); United States v. Sisk, 629 F.2d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir.
1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); Bohms v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 283, 285 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 964 (1968); Howell v. Terminal Rr. Ass'n of St. Louis, 155 F.2d 807, 808 (8th Cir.
1946).
30. See, e.g., Home Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Joslin, Nos. 80-1556, 1558 (8th Cir. Oct.
6, 1980). See also In re Hansen, 702 F.2d 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3539 (1983).
In anothei case this court dismissed an appeal from an order remanding to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. Udoh v. Nolan, No. 80-1506 (8th Cir. Oct. 29, 1980). Although the dismissal
order does not say so, dismissal was on grounds that the remand was not a final order. Id.
District court remands to government administrative agencies or departments (see Giordano v.
Roudebush, 565 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1977); Silver v. Secretary of Army, 554 F.2d 664, 665
(5th Cir. 1977); Bohms v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 283, 285 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 964
(1968)), retirement committees (see Darr v. Atchinson, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry., No. 80-1624 (8th
Cir. October 6, 1980); Weeks v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 80-1630 (8th Cir., dismissal order of
August 29, 1980)), or other similar decision-making entities are ordinarily not appealable.
For a recent reported decision discussing nonappealable remands, see Freeman United Coal
Mining v. Director, Office ofW.C.P., 721 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1983).
31. 720 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1983).
32. In re Bestmann, 720 F.2d 484, 486-87 (8th Cir. 1983).
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Faced with these contrasting principles, the Eighth Circuit
postured the jurisdictional question and ruled as follows:
The question presented here comes down to whether the
Bankruptcy Court's order denying relief from the stay is a
final order. We hold that it is final. ... The Bankruptcy
Court conclusively determined that Aetna is not the
exclusive owner of the land. As far as Aetna is concerned,
nothing remains for the Bankruptcy Court to do. The
order terminates Aetna's adversary proceeding. If the
order were not viewed as final, and no appeal allowed
until the main bankruptcy proceeding terminated, the
entire bankruptcy proceeding would have to be
recommenced if this Court ultimately found that the
estate had no interest in the property. Further, if the
order is not treated as final, what may be Aetna's
property will be tied up in lengthy bankruptcy
proceedings, even though this Court may ultimately find
that the property is not part of the debtor's estate. 33
The above passage could be criticized for ignoring the reality
that the bankruptcy order was not final as to all parties and issues
and that similar reasoning could be employed to permit an
interlocutory appeal any time a single party plaintiff or defendant
was dismissed from a multi-party lawsuit. But Judge Arnold,
writing for the majority, thwarted such criticism by explaining that
the litigation at issue should not be viewed as the entire bankruptcy
proceeding in deciding whether the order is appealable.3 4 Rather,
he explained, the litigation should be viewed as just the adversary
proceeding brought by Aetna. 35 Judge Arnold concluded that as
contrasted with other proceedings, 36 in bankruptcy the federal
courts have taken a more liberal view of a separate appealable
order. 37 An alternative basis given for the holding and overruling of
Ewald was that orders concerning stays are similar to permanent
injunctions, which are appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 38
33. In re Leimer, 724 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir. 1984).
34. Id. Judge Arnold stated the test of appealability as follows: "[Ain order is appealable only if
it 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
ment.' "724 F.2d at 745 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978),; Catlin
v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
35. In re Leimer, 724 F.2d at 745.
36. Id. (citing 6J. MOORE, W. TAGGARr &J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERA . PRACTICE 54.19 (2d
ed. 1983); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427,431-32 & n.3 (1956)).
37. 724 F.2d at 745 (citing In re Yermakov, 718 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Saco
Local Development Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443-46 (1st Cir. 1983)). -
38. 724 F.2d at 746 (citing Mayor & Aldermen of Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U.S. 259, 266-67
19841
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The Eighth Circuit ruling, while inconsistent with its prior
unpublished decision in Ewald, was consistent with decisions of the
Second and Eleventh Circuits. 39 Perhaps as significant as the
holding on the merits was the announcement that "unpublished
opinions of this Court are not intended to create binding
precedent. "40 Leimer presented a difficult issue, and if the decision
is subject to criticism it is only because it departs from the
requirement of a final judgment and leaves doubt about the kinds
of orders, other than final judgments, that can be appealed.
IV. STARE DECISIS
Campbell and Leimer are important to Eighth Circuit
practitioners because they herald a change in the law. But they are
also important because they demonstrate a willingness by the
Eighth Circuit to reject precedents when the error of past decisions
becomes apparent. Only those who maintain that stare decisis is a
fundamental principle of American jurisprudence should be upset
by these rulings. In England they have a rule of principled
adjudication, perhaps it should be called the rule of principled
adjudication, of stare decisis, meaning the decision stands. But in
America sometimes the decision stands and sometimes it does not.
Whether openly confessed or not, the case history of school
desegregation, rights of the accused and convicted, and voting
rights establishes beyond cavil that the Supreme Court has not
blindly followed stare decisis. And why should the United States
Courts of Appeals, when faced with less weighty matters, be
unwilling to change their minds and decisions?
Otherwise stated, the question is should American
jurisprudence have abandoned stare decisis? Consistency of
decisions is certainly more than just the hobgoblin of small minds
Emerson described. And clarity and consistency are desirable in
and of themselves, especially in areas of jurisdiction such as
Campbell and Leimer where it may be less important what the rule is
than that there be a rule that the bench and bar can follow. But
(1913): H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 344, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NE.s 5787, 5963, 6300). Seealso 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) (1982).
39. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1309 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (order of
bankruptcy court not interlocutory, but appealable final order); In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24, 26 n.4
(2d Cir. 1982) (denial of relief from automatic stay held equivalent to permanent injunction, thus
appealable).
40. In re Leimer, 724 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir. 1984). Judge Arnold elaborated as follows: "The
decision of a panel not to publish an opinion usually represents the judges' view that the case is
without substantial value as a precedent." Id. at 745-46 (citing Plan for Publication of Opinions S 1,




consistency and accuracy are often mutually exclusive terms, and
when previous holdings are proved to be in error, accuracy should
prevail at the expense of consistency.
As additional cases present to the court slightly different
perspectives on an issue, the court may view the effect of its initial
holding differently. The complexity and unpredictability of any
case that follows the announcement of a hard and fast rule can
demand a different response requiring modification or at least
clarification of the rule. When judges see the nuances of their
decisions and decline the logical extensions or applications of their
holding, should the judges not be commended for their willingness
to rethink instead of condemned for their further insight and
understanding? Again this may be less true in cases involving
jurisdictional rules, where it is most important that there simply be
a pronouncement or an agreement on some particular rule. But
jurisdictional rules such as those announced in Campbell and Leimer
determine court access and thus may be as important as more
readily recognized substantive constitutional rights.
When confronted with inconsistent prior statements or
positions, John Kennedy would simply reply, "I don't think that
way any more." To live is to change, and judges both individually
and collectively as a court should be allowed, even encouraged, to
change their minds within the constraints of constitutional
adjudication. The point here is not to champion abolishment or
wholesale abandonment of case precedents. Rather, the point is
that both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts should be
bound by stare decisis only to the extent that upon considered
reflection the court decides the case precedents should be followed.
V. CONCLUSION
The two cases discussed above present a potential trap for the
uninformed. Practitioners in the Eighth Circuit should be aware of
those decisions and also of the court's new willingness to overrule
prior unpublished decisions.
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